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4.0 Executive Summary 
 
The NESC was asked to support a review of a lightning analysis done at KSC.  Systems 
Engineering and Integration (SE&I) was working on this issue as one of the integrated hazards 
they were trying to document.  The existing catenary wire system appeared to provide protection 
against lightning strikes above a given current level but did not protect against lower intensity 
strikes.  The strike current level that is “acceptable” was not determined, so upgrades to the 
catenary system might be required to adequately protect the vehicle when the rotating support 
structure (RSS) is rolled back for loading and launch.  The NESC role was to assist in a review 
of the analysis to determine lightning risk and recommend upgrades to reduce that risk.   
 
The review of lightning analysis was accomplished at two Technical Exchange Meeting (TEMs) 
– one in July and one in October of 2005.  The stated primary objective of the TEMs was to 
understand the existing lightning protection at Pad 39B and then determine, based on present-day 
methodologies, what is the capability of this design.  KSC could then work in a logical and 
technically sound manner to address and resolve any lightning risks and concerns. 
 
The scope of the two-day discussion only addressed air terminal (catenary) issues.  Subjects such 
as bonding, grounding, personal safety, secondary effects, and surge protection were beyond the 
scope of the analysis.  The main discussion was the safety of the vehicle while at Pad 39B and in 
particular vulnerability while:  
 
 Vehicle is fueled,  
 RSS is rolled from the vehicle, and 
 Gaseous Oxygen (GOx) Vent Arm is not positioned over the External Tank (ET), as this 
would represent the worst case condition for the vehicle.   
 
The NESC and Space Shuttle Program (SSP) lightning experts concluded the existing system has 
vulnerabilities at lower current lightning strikes.  Several schemes for additional catenary wires 
to provide enhanced protection were discussed and appeared to have technical merit. Temporary 
means of protection enhancement such as location of mobile cranes or balloons were also 
discussed.  Future work to study personnel safety and enhancement of the lightning protection 
system was recommended.  Specifically, Monte Carlo simulations of various lightning strikes 
were to be provided to the NESC team for additional assessment. 
 
Immediately following the conclusion of the TEMs, preliminary results of the meetings were 
presented to the SSP by Billy Stover.  Additional planned near-term work included the 
generation of Monte Carlo results based on a probabilistic analysis quantifying the possibility of 
a direct lightning strike attaching to the flight hardware while at Pad 39B in launch configuration 
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(RSS rotated back with GOx Vent Arm extended and withdrawn) during July 13 - 31, 2005.  July 
historically is the highest month of the year for lightning strikes.  The NESC and SSP lightning 
experts were to review and comment on these results and reconvene in July to discuss the results, 
Monte Carlo methodology, configurations, and assumptions used in the simulations. 
 
The NESC and SSP lightning experts concluded the Space Shuttle could be at risk of lightning 
strikes in various configurations, particularly for strikes with relatively small current amplitudes.  
Safety for personnel and secondary effects to equipment were not discussed in detail in this 
forum. 
 
The stated objectives of the two-day lightning TEM at KSC were met.  The technical 
assessments of the NESC experts were conveyed in real-time to minimize delays, and are also 
included verbatim in this report.  Following the TEM, the NESC experts continued to support a 
technical review of the Monte Carlo analysis.  These results were also conveyed in real-time.  
This report contains a summary of those major inputs. 
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5.0 Plan 
 
To provide specific expertise, Robert Kichak, NESC Discipline Expert for Power and Avionics, 
contacted his Super Problem Resolution Team (SPRT) and located external experts.  This 
followed a recommendation of potential candidates from Dr. Robert Scully, who is an SPRT 
member but was supporting the assessment for the SSP.  The independent lightning experts 
contracted for the consultation by the NESC included Dr. Vladimir Rakov of the University of 
Florida, Mr. Richard Kithil of the National Lightning Safety Institute, and Mr. Noel Sargent 
Senior Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Engineer at GRC and former member of National 
Interagency Coordination Group for Lightning Research.  The SSP also provided several 
external experts including personnel from The Aerospace Corporation who had expert 
knowledge of the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) Launch Complex lightning 
protection.  In addition, Dr. Frank Fisher of Lightning Technologies, who was a key participant 
in the design of the Apollo and Pad 39B catenary systems and the Mobile Launch Platform 
(MLP) lightning provisions, was included as an SSP expert. 
 
The effectiveness of the existing lightning catenary wire and single tower system at Pad 39B 
(Space Shuttle), which as an outgrowth of the system that had initially been employed for the 
Apollo Program, was analyzed by Drs. Pedro Medelius and Carlos Mata at KSC.  Two 
approaches were employed - the "classical" rolling sphere method (RSM), as described in 
Section 7.1, and RSM in conjunction with Mont Carlo simulations.  As revealed by both 
approaches, the existing system showed effectiveness for high current lightning strikes (100 
kiloamperes [kA] or greater), but showed varying degrees of vulnerability for lower current 
lightning strikes depending on the specific configuration.  Based on historical data, the current 
lightning strike was demonstrated to be on the order of 31 kA.  Also, based on both historical and 
analytical techniques, it was estimated Pads 39 A and 39B will see approximately three lightning 
strikes per year, with July and August being the peak months for electrical storm activity.  A 
particularly severe electrical storm occurred near the launch facility prior to the launch of STS–8 
on August 30, 1983, and is shown in Figure 5.0-1.   
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Figure 5.0-1.  Powerful Electrical Storm near KSC Launch Complex Prior to Launch of 
STS–8, August 30, 1983 (NASA Photo) 
 
 
 NASA Engineering and Safety Center  
Technical Consultation Report 
Document #: 
RP-06-39 
Version: 
1.0 
Title: 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Pad B Catenary 
Capability Analysis and Technical Exchange Meeting 
(TEM) Support 
Page #: 
11 of 116 
 
NESC Request No. 05-030-E 
6.0 Description of the Problem, Proposed Solutions, and Risk 
Assessment 
 
The existing lightning protection system at Pad 39B for the Space Shuttle is an outgrowth of a 
system that was put in place for the Apollo Program.  Dr. Frank Fisher of Lightning 
Technologies was a key participant in the design and implementation of that system.  He 
conveyed to the NESC team that the catenary wire provision was put in place quickly (as 
assurance against possible vehicle damage causing critical launch delays) rather than being 
implemented as a comprehensive system designed to provide a high degree of guaranteed 
protection.  Also, the technology of lightning protection has evolved over time with considerable 
work being conducted by groups such as the electric utilities companies, aircraft manufacturers, 
universities, and others.  Several accepted present-day methods for analysis of lightning 
protection were used by Drs. Medelius and Mata to study the expected lightning environment for 
the Pad 39B facility and to analyze the degree of protection against direct lightning attachment to 
the Space Shuttle.  The specific physical configuration directly affects the vulnerability, so cases 
that were considered included the RSS next to and rolled back from the Space Shuttle, and the 
GOx Vent Arm both extended and withdrawn from the ET.  Elements of the lightning protection 
system at Pad 39B are shown in Figure 6.0-1 and consist of an 80 foot insulating mast on top of 
the Fixed Support Structure (FSS), a catenary wire system that runs from the mast in a 
North/South direction to grounds 1000 feet away on each side of the mast, the RSS which can 
either be next to or away from the Space Shuttle, and a GOx vent that can either be extended or 
retracted from the top of the ET. 
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Figure 6.0-1.  Pad 39B Lightning Protection 
 
The NESC team investigated the KSC Pad 39B catenary lightning protection, consisting of the 
two shielding wires, their terminations to earth, and the cabling interface between the Pad, MLP, 
and Orbiter.  The team was also shown elements of the launch pad detection systems, including 
the Catenary Wire Lightning Instrumentation System and the Induced Voltage Instrumentation 
System.  These are described in Appendix I.  Random and cursory bonding and grounding 
measurements were performed to investigate equi-potential connections and conductive soil 
conditions.  During the walkthrough it was observed that personal lightning safety information 
messages were absent, including near key areas such as the catenary ground points. 
 
The existing analysis approach using today's standards, techniques, and methodology was 
presented to the TEM after seeing all the hardware.  Lightning Technologies presented historical 
background information and KSC presented the lightning protection systems and capabilities.  
Dr. Medilius also presented several possible techniques to improve the performance of the 
existing system by the incorporation of additional wires.  The technical teams provided feedback, 
concerns, issues, and in general, a consensus that the analysis presented by Dr. Medelius 
correctly identified deficiencies of existing system capabilities.  Based on this, the NESC team 
feels that there is a technical basis for concluding there is an overall lightning risk with respect to 
flight hardware.  The NESC team also identified the need to better qualify and quantify 
personnel and hardware risk exposure.  
Insulating 
Mast & 
Catenary 
Wires 
RSS 
(Rotated 
away from 
vehicle) 
GOx Vent 
Arm (in 
extended 
position)  
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7.0 Data Analysis  
 
7.1 Electrogeometrical Model (EGM) 
 
The attachment of the leader to the strike object is often described using the EGM, the core of 
which is the concept of a “striking distance.”  This concept obscures some of the significant 
physics, but allows the development of relatively simple and useful techniques for designing 
lightning protection systems for various structures.  The striking distance can be defined as the 
distance from the tip of the descending leader to the object to be struck at the instant when an 
upward connecting leader is initiated from this object.  It is assumed that the lightning 
termination point is uniquely determined.  For a given striking distance, an imaginary surface can 
be defined above the ground and objects on the ground (see Figure 7.1-1) such that, when the 
descending leader passes through that surface at a specific location, the leader is “captured” by a 
specific point on the ground or on a grounded object.  The geometrical construction of this 
surface can be accomplished simply by rolling an imaginary sphere of radius equal to the 
assumed striking distance across the ground and across objects on the ground, i.e., the RSM.
1
   
The locus of all points traversed by the center of the rolling sphere forms the imaginary capture 
surface.  Those points the rolling sphere touches can be struck, according to this approach and 
accordingly points where the sphere does not touch cannot.  Figure 7.1-2 illustrates the rolling 
sphere method.  The shaded area in Figure 7.1-2 is that area into which lightning cannot enter. 
 
                                                 
1
 Lee, R.H. “Protection zone for buildings against lightning strokes using transmission line protection practice.” 
IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl. 14 (1978): 465-70. and 
NFPA 780 (National Fire Protection Association) Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems. 
Available from NFPA, 1 Batterymarch Park, P.O. Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101 (1997). 
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Figure 7.1-1. Illustration of Capture Surfaces of Two Towers and Earth’s Surface in the 
EGM Model - rs is the Striking Distance - Vertical Arrows Represent Descending Leaders 
Assumed to be Uniformly Distributed Above the Capture Surfaces (Adapted from 
Bazelyan and Raizer)
2
 
 
Figure 7.1-2. Illustration of The Rolling Sphere Method for Two Objects Shown in Black - 
D is The Striking Distance (Same As rs In Figure 7.1-1) - Shaded Area is that Area into 
which Lightning Cannot Enter (Adapted from Szczerbinski)
3
 
                                                 
2 Bazelyan, E.M., and Yu Raizer. Lightning Physics and Lightning Protection. Bristol: IOP, 2000, p. 325. 
3
 Szczerbinski, M. “A discussion of 'Faraday cage' lightning protection and application to real building structures.” 
J. Electrostatics 48 (2000): 145-54. 
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In the RSM, the striking distance is assumed to be the same for any object projecting above the 
earth’s surface and for the earth itself.  There are variations of the EGM in which the assumption 
of different striking distances for objects of different geometry are used.
4
  The main application 
of the RSM is positioning air terminals on an ordinary structure.  The positioning is such that one 
of the terminals, rather than a roof edge or other part of the structure, initiates the upward leader 
that intercepts the descending leader and hence, becomes the lightning attachment point. 
 
The striking distance is usually expressed as a function of prospective return-stroke peak current.  
The procedure to obtain such an expression typically involves assumptions of leader geometry, 
total leader charge, distribution of charge along the leader channel, and critical average electric 
field between the leader tip and the stroke object at the time of the initiation of upward 
connecting leader from this object.  This critical electric field is assumed to be equal to the 
average breakdown field from long laboratory spark experiments with rod-rod and rod-plane 
gaps.  This varies with the waveshape of applied voltage as well as with other factors such as the 
high-voltage generator circuitry.  The typical assumed values range from 200 to 600 kV/m.  As a 
result, an expression can be obtained relating the striking distance to the total leader charge.  In 
the next step, the observed correlation (see Figure 7.1-3) between the charge and resultant return-
stroke peak current is used to express the striking distance, rs, in terms of the peak current, I.
5
  
The most frequently used striking-distance expression, included in many lightning protection 
standards, is: 
 
rs = 10 I
0.65
   (1) 
 
where I is in kA and rs is in meters.  This and other expressions for the striking distance found in 
literature are illustrated in Figure 7.1-4.  Given the assumptions involved and large scatter seen 
in Figure 7.1-3, each of these relationships is necessarily simplistic, and the range of variation 
among the individual expressions (see Figure 7.1-4) is a factor of three or more.  Therefore, there 
are considerable uncertainties in estimating the striking distance.  However, there is satisfactory 
long-term experience with the RSM (Hungarian Standard on Lightning Protection since 1962
6
) 
as applied to placement of lightning rods on ordinary structures and with the EGM in general as 
applied to power lines.  This experience is the primary justification for the continuing use of this 
method in lightning protection studies.  As of today, the EGM is the best engineering tool for 
estimating lightning incidence to structures that is endorsed by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC).  The 
                                                 
4
 Eriksson, A.J. “The incidence of lightning strikes to power lines.”  IEEE Trans. PWRD-2 (1987): 859-70. 
5 Berger, K., and E. Garabagnati. “Lightning current parameters.” URSI Conference, Florence, Italy (1984). 
6
 Horvath, T. Rolling Sphere – Theory and Application.” Proceedings of the 25th Int’l Conerence. on Lightning 
Protection, Rhodes, Greece (2000): 301-305. 
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RSM is also endorsed by the recently released (January 2006) IEC lightning protection document 
(No. 62305).
7
 
 
 
Figure 7.1-3. Scatter Plot of Impulse Charge, Q, Versus Return-Stroke Peak Current, I 
(Note: Both Vertical and Horizontal Scales are Logarithmic - The Best Fit to Data, I = 10.6 
Q
0.7
, Where Q is in Coulombs and I is in Kiloamperes, was used in Deriving Equation (1) - 
Adapted From Berger
8
) 
 
                                                 
7
 Protection Against Lightning. International Electrotechnical Commission Doc. No. 62305, January 2006. 
8
 Berger, K.  Mesungen und Resultate der Blitzforschung auf dem Monte San Salvatore bei Lugano, der Jahre 1963-
1971. Bulletin SEV 63 (1972): 1403-22. 
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Figure 7.1-4. Striking Distance versus Return-Stroke Peak Current: Curve 1, Golde
9
; 
Curve 2, Wagner
10
 (1963); Curve 3, Love
11
; Curve 4, Ruhling
12
; X, theory of Davis
13
; 0, 
Estimates from Two-Dimensional Photographs by Eriksson
14; ⁪, Estimates from Three-
Dimensional Photography by Eriksson
15
  (Adapted from Golde and Eriksson as Referenced 
Above) 
                                                 
9 Golde, R.H.  “On the frequency of occurrence and the distribution of lightning flashes to transmission lines.” AIEE 
Trans. 64(III) (1945): 902-10. 
10Wagner, C.F. “Relation between stroke current and velocity of the return stroke.” AIEE Trans. 82: (1963): 609-
617.  
11
 Love, E. R. “Improvements on lightning stroke modeling and applications to the design of EHV and UHV 
transmission lines.” M.Sc. Thesis, University of Colorado 1973. 
12
 Rühling, F. “Modelluntersuchungen über den Schutzraum und ihre Redeutung für Gebäudeblitzableiter.” Bull. 
Schweiz. Elektrotech. Ver. 63 (1972): 522-528. 
13
 Davis, R.  “Frequency of lightning flashover on overhead lines.  Gas Discharges and the Electricity Supply 
Industr.” London: Butterworths (1962): 125-38. 
14
 Eriksson, A.J. “Lightning and tall structures.” Trans. S. Afr. Inst. Electr. Eng. 69(8) (1978): 238-52. 
15
 Ibid. 
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The EGM can be used for estimating lightning incidence to different elements (usually to the 
protected object) of a structure as follows: 
 
1. Assume the spatial distribution of descending lightning leaders above all the capture 
surfaces (see Figure 7.1-1) and specify the ground flash density, Ng (typically Ng = 
constant).  
2. Find the striking distance, rs(I), and then the projection, S(I), of the resultant capture 
surface of the element in question onto the ground surface.  
3. Specify the probability density function of lightning peak currents, f(I).  
4. Integrate the product Ng x S(I) x f(I) x dI from 0 to Imax, to obtain the lightning incidence 
(number of strikes per year).  
 
Alternatively, one can eliminate finding S(I) in item (2) and entire item (4) from the outlined 
procedure using the Monte Carlo technique.  It is important to note that the use of the RSM alone 
does not generally allow an estimate of lightning incidence to an element of structure (for 
example, to the Space Shuttle on the MLP), because such an estimate requires information on the 
spatial distribution of lightning leaders, which is not part of the standard RSM. 
 
7.2 Monte Carlo Results 
 
The preliminary Monte Carlo results were distributed on July 11, 2005.  A second TEM to 
review these was deferred until October 5, 2005, due to the STS-114 launch and Agency post-
flight analysis activities.  The NESC experts reviewed these Monte Carlo results and provided 
comments prior to and at the TEM held on October 5, 2005.  Key inputs from Dr. Rakov and Mr. 
Kithil are summarized in Appendix B. 
 
The final Monte Carlo analysis report is included as Appendix C.  Dr. Medelius presented final 
results of the Lightning TEMs to the Shuttle Engineering Review Board (SERB) on November 8, 
2005.  That presentation is provided as Appendix D.  An expanded supplemental paper 
discussing lightning safety was submitted by Mr. Kithil on October 3, 2005, and is provided as 
Appendix E. 
 
The detailed technical discussion of the June 21 and 22, 2005, TEM is provided verbatim from 
the NESC experts in Appendices F, G, and H. 
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7.3 Lightning Incidence to Various Objects 
 
This section briefly describes how cloud-to-ground lightning "decides" on its ground termination 
point.  Ground flashes are normally initiated by stepped leaders that originate in the 
thundercloud.  As the downward-extending leader channel (usually negatively charged) 
approaches the ground, the enhanced electric field intensity at irregularities of the Earth's surface 
or at protruding grounded objects increases and eventually exceeds the breakdown value of air.  
As a result, one or more upward-moving leaders are initiated from those points, and when it 
contacts a branch of the downward-moving stepped leader, the point of lightning termination on 
ground is determined.  Grounded vertical objects produce relatively large electric field 
enhancement near their upper extremities, so that upward-moving connecting leaders from these 
objects start earlier than from the surrounding ground.  Therefore, they serve to make the object a 
preferential lightning termination point.  In general, the higher the object is, the greater the field 
enhancement and hence, the higher the probability that a stepped leader will terminate on the 
object.  In the limit, when the height (field enhancement capability) of the object becomes so 
large that the upward-moving leader from the object tip can be initiated by in-cloud charges (or, 
more likely, by in-cloud discharge processes, as opposed to being initiated by the charge on the 
descending stepped leader), the object becomes capable of initiating upward lightning.  The 
latter, as opposed to a "normal," downward lightning, would not occur if the object were not 
there.  Ground-based objects, with heights ranging from about 100 to 500 meters, experience 
both downward and upward flashes with the proportion of these types of lightning being a 
function of object height.  Eriksson derived the following equation for the annual lightning 
incidence N (yr
-1
) to ground-based objects, including both downward and upward flashes:
16
 
 
N = 24 × 10
-6
 Hs 
2.05
 Ng  (2) 
 
where Hs is the object height in meters and Ng is the ground flash density in km
-2
 yr
-1
.  To do so, 
he employed: 
 
 Observations of lightning incidence to structures of heights ranging from 20 to 540 
meters in different countries,  
 Corresponding local values of the annual number of thunderstorm days TD, and   
 An empirical equation relating Ng and TD. For Pad 39B, Hs = 106 m, Ng = 10 km
-2
 yr
-1
, 
and N from equation (2) is about 3.4 yr
-1
.  
 
                                                 
16
 Eriksson, A.J. “The incidence of lightning strikes to power lines.”  IEEE Trans. PWRD-2 (1987): 859-70. 
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Eriksson tabulated the observed percentage of upward flashes as a function of a free-standing 
structure's height, reproduced in Table 7.3-1.
17
  Eriksson and Meal fitted the data in Table 7.3-1 
with the following expression:
18
 
 
Pu = 52.8 ln Hs – 230  (3) 
 
where Pu is the percentage of upward flashes and Hs is the structure height in meters.  This 
equation is valid only for structure heights ranging from 78 to 518 meters, since for Hs = 78 m Pu 
= 0 and for Hs = 518 meters Pu = 100 percent.  Structures with heights less than 78 meters are not 
covered by equation (2), because they are expected to be struck by downward flashes only. 
Structures with a height of greater than 518 meters are not covered, because they are expected to 
experience upward flashes only.  For Pad 39B, Hs = 106 meters, and the percentage of upward 
flashes from equation (3) is 16 percent. 
 
Table 7.3-1.  The Percentage of Upward Flashes from Tall Structures (Adapted from 
Eriksson
19
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a
An effective height of 350 meters has been assigned by Eriksson to Berger's 70 meter high mountain-top 
towers to account for the enhancement of the electric field by the mountain whose top is 640 meters 
                                                 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Eriksson, A.J., and D.V.Meal. “The incidence of direct lightning strikes to structures and overhead lines.”  
Lightning and Power Systems, London: IEE Conf. Publication No. 236 (1984): 67-71. 
19
 Eriksson, A.J. “Lightning and tall structures.” Trans. S. Afr. Inst. Electr. Eng. 69(8) (1978): 238-52. 
Reference Structure height, meters Percentage of 
upward flashes 
Pierce (1972) 150 
200 
300 
400 
23 
50 
80 
91 
McCann (1944) 110 
180 
400 
  8 
24 
96 
Berger (1972)  350
a
 84 
Gorin (1972);  
Gorin et al. (1976) 
540   92
b
 
Garbagnati et al. (1974)    500
c
 98 
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above Lake Lugano (914 meters above sea level).  Pierce assigned a different effective height of 270 
meters to the Berger's towers.
20
 
 
b50 percent of the flashes recorded in this study were classified as “unidentified.”  The relative incidence 
of upward flashes is based upon analysis of only the identified data. 
 
c
Garbagnati et al.'s towers were 40 meters high, located on mountain tops, 980 and 993 meters above sea 
level.
21
  Eriksson does not give any explanations of the assumed effective height of 500 meters.
22 
 
In practice, structures having heights less than approximately 100 meters are often assumed to be 
struck by downward lightning only, and the upper height limit can be taken as 500 meters.  
Accordingly, the total lightning incidence N to a structure is the sum of the downward-flash 
incidence Nd and upward-flash incidence Nu if the structure height is in the range from about 100 
to 500 meters, N = Nd for structures shorter than 100 meters, and N = Nu for structures taller than 
500 meters.  If both downward and upward flashes are expected, they are often treated separately 
in estimating the lightning incidence to an object, as described below.  
 
7.3.1 Downward Flashes   
 
When the incidence of downward lightning is estimated, it is common to ascribe an equivalent 
attractive (or exposure) area to the grounded object.  The attractive area can be viewed as an area 
on flat ground surface that would receive the same number of lightning strikes in the absence of 
the object as does the object placed in the center of that area.  In other words, in computing 
lightning incidence to a structure, the structure is replaced by an equivalent area on ground.  For 
a free-standing structure whose plan-view dimensions are much smaller than its height (such as a 
mast, tower, or chimney), this area, A, is circular and is generally given by A = Ra
2
 where Ra is 
the equivalent attractive radius.  For straight, horizontally extended structures (such as power 
lines or their sections), the equivalent attractive area is rectangular and is sometimes termed the 
"shadow zone" or "attractive swath."  For example, if a power line has a length l, and an effective 
width b (usually taken as the horizontal distance between overhead shield wires or between the 
outer phase conductors), its equivalent attractive  
                                                 
20 Pierce, E.T. “Triggered lightning and some unsuspected lightning hazards.” Stanford Research Institute, Menlo 
Park, California, (1971): 20 p. 
21
 Berger, K., and E. Garabagnati. “Lightning current parameters.” URSI Conference, Florence, Italy (1984). 
22
 Eriksson, A.J. “Lightning and tall structures.” Trans. S. Afr. Inst. Electr. Eng. 69(8) (1978): 238-52. 
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area is generally estimated as A = l(b + 2Ra) where Ra is generally thought to be approximately 
equal to the equivalent attractive radius for a free-standing structure of the same height.
23
  
Further, the local ground flash density Ng is assumed to be spatially uniform in the absence of the 
structure, so that the downward lightning incidence to the structure is found as  
 
Nd = A Ng (4) 
 
Usually Ng is in km
_2
 yr
_1
 so that A should be expressed in km
2
 to obtain Nd in yr
_1
 (strikes per 
year). 
  
The equivalent attractive radius Ra is usually assumed to be a function of structure height Hs and 
is generally expressed as  
 
Ra = α Hs

 (5) 
 
where α and  are empirical constants.  The procedures used to obtain equation (5), from data on 
lightning incidence to structures of different height, is given (for example) by Eriksson.
24
  In 
equation (5), both Hs and Ra are in meters, and different values of α and  have been proposed.  
For example, Whitehead et al. gave α = 2 and  = 1.09 for transmission lines, while CIGRE 
Document 63 recommended α = 14 and  = 0.6.25  The attractive radius for individual strikes 
should depend on the charge carried by the descending leader, this charge being correlated with 
the associated return-stroke peak current.  In this regard, equation (5) should be understood as 
representing the entire distribution of peak currents.  In the EGM approach (Section 7.1), which 
is widely used for the estimation of lightning incidence in lightning protection studies (e.g., 
CIGRE Document), the equivalent attractive radius explicitly depends on the statistical 
distribution of lightning peak currents.
26
   
  
                                                 
23
 Eriksson, A.J. “The incidence of lightning strikes to power lines.”  IEEE Trans. PWRD-2 (1987): 859-70. and 
Rakov, V.A., and A.O. Lutz.  “A new technique for estimating equivalent attractive radius for downward lightning 
flashes.”  Proceedings of 20th Int’l Conf. on Lightning Protection, Interlaken, Switzerland, Paper 2.2 (1990). 
24
 Eriksson, A.J. “Lightning and tall structures.” Trans. S. Afr. Inst. Electr. Eng. 69(8) (1978): 238-52. and 
Eriksson, A.J. “The incidence of lightning strikes to power lines.”  IEEE Trans. PWRD-2 (1987): 859-70. 
25
 Whitehead, J.T., et al. “Estimating lightning performance of transmission lines II-Updates to analytical model.” 
IEEE Working Group Report, IEEE Trans. PWRD-8 (1993): 1254-66. 
CIGRE Document 63. Guide to Procedures for Estimating the Lightning Performance of Transmission Lines, 
October 1991. 
26
 Eriksson, A.J. “The incidence of lightning strikes to power lines.”  IEEE Trans. PWRD-2 (1987): 859-70. and 
Rakov, V.A., and A.O. Lutz.  “A new technique for estimating equivalent attractive radius for downward lightning 
flashes.”  Proceedings of 20th Int’l Conf. on Lightning Protection, Interlaken, Switzerland, Paper 2.2 (1990). 
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Estimation of Nd from equation (3) implies a reasonably long-term value of ground flash density 
and yields a long-term average value of lightning incidence.  For example, if a 60 meter tower is 
located in a part of Florida where Ng = 10 km
_2
 yr
_1
, the long-term average downward lightning 
incidence will be about 0.5 yr
-1
 (assuming α = 2 and  = 1).  That is, the tower will be struck on 
average every other year.  The use of equation (2) for Pad 39B would result in a lightning 
incidence value of about 1 yr
-1
.   
 
7.3.2 Upward Flashes   
 
Once the incidence of downward lightning Nd is found from equation (4) using the concept of an 
equivalent attractive area, the incidence of upward flashes Nu can be determined by subtracting 
Nd from N given by equation (2).  Recall that if the structure height is less than approximately 
100 meters, it is usually assumed that Nu = 0.  If only the percentage of upward flashes is sought, 
equation (3) can be used. 
 
Upward flashes tend to develop from the highest point of the object, which is normally an air 
terminal of its Lightning Protection System (LPS).  For this reason, upward flashes are usually of 
no concern in estimating the “shielding failure” mode of lightning interaction with the object. 
 
7.4 Catenary Capability for Lightning Protection 
 
A catenary or overhead shield wire (OHSW) is the preferred air terminal design for intercepting 
lightning at critical, high value facilities.  Franklin Rods, another air terminal design, are 
considered inefficient since they do not begin functionality until the lightning threat is upon the 
structure to be protected.  Air terminal designs such as Early Streamer Emitter (ESE) and 
Dissipation Array System/Charge Dissipation System (DAS/CTS) have been studied
27
 with 
conclusions that their performance is greatly exaggerated by vendors. 
 
Air terminal designs are one element of a comprehensive lightning protection system.  See Table 
7.4-1 for an introduction to other necessary ingredients in the family of components.  See also 
KSC-STD-E-0012E “Facility Grounding and Lightning Protection, Standard For” August 1, 
2001, for further information.   
 
The Space Shuttle is at risk from direct lightning strikes while at the launch platform.
                                                 
27
 Uman, M.A., and Rakov, V.A. “A Critical Review of Non-Conventional Approaches to Lightning Protection.”  
Transactions of the American Meteorological Society, December (2002). 
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Table 7.4-1.  Matrix of Lightning Protection Sub-Systems 
     
 Direct 
Strike 
Indirect 
Strike 
Exterior 
Location 
Interior 
Location 
People 
Safety 
Structure 
Safety 
AIR 
TERMINALS 
 
YES 
 
N/A 
 
YES 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
YES 
DOWN-
CONDUCTORS 
 
YES 
 
N/A 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
N/A 
 
YES 
 
BONDING 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
GROUNDING 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
SHIELDING 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
SURGE 
PROTECTION 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
DETECTION 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
POLICIES & 
PROCEDURES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
YES 
 
YES 
Apply these sub-systems as appropriate (YES/NO) to specific facilities or structures. 
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7.4.1 General Observations 
 
7.4.1.1  Magnitude of Lightning Threat  
 
In 2004, there were some 56,206 ground lightning strikes in the KSC area.  KSC has an average 
measurable flash density of about 17 strikes per square kilometer per year.  A Bell Curve 
distributes most of the lightning within the June - September period, taking into account multiple 
ground strike points in sonic flashes. 
  
7.4.1.2  Recorded Data  
 
Rogowski Coils at the OHSWs have captured lightning characteristics - amplitude, polarity, 
waveform - for many years.  On average, three to five strikes occur to each launch pad OHSW 
annually.  Other helpful statistics which quantify the lightning threat are available from 45
th
 
Weather, Patrick AFB and from the NASA KSC Weather Office.  In short, lightning that strikes 
the launch pad is severe and consequences from strikes to the Space Shuttle could be significant. 
 
7.4.1.3  Theoretical Assumptions  
 
When presented with various RSMs describing protective radii, the NESC and SSP lightning 
experts consensus was that areas not protected by the existing OHSW included the Space 
Shuttle.  About 75 percent of the total structure is “enclosed” by the assumptions inherent in the 
RSM.   However, it must be remembered that lightning is stochastic and irregular in conforming 
to theoretical models.  
 
7.4.2 Conclusions 
 
The KSC Pad 39B OHSW design ranks fifth behind designs used by other major space agencies.  
 
 Russia – Baikonur employs twin towers at either side of the launch platform.  
 France – CNES French Guiana uses four towers at corners of the launch platform.  
 China – Jinquan uses two towers on opposite sides of the launch platform.  
 United States (US) – US Air Force Space Launch Complex (SLC) 40 (decommissioned 
Titan IV) and 41 (Atlas V) use an overhead net design supported by four towers to obtain 
the most efficient design, and 37 (Delta IV) uses a two-tower system – one on each side 
of the vehicle, each having its own catenary wires. 
 
Pads 39A/B should adopt a contemporary OHSW lightning protection treatment in keeping with 
recognized codes and standards as is consistent with proactive safety measures.  Additional 
OHSWs are needed to provide effective lightning shielding for the Space Shuttle. The Study 
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Group considered several alternative designs. At a minimum requirement, two new support 
towers are suggested. They should be located East of the exiting Pads and separated by at least 
300 feet. Exact calculations as to tower locations, tower heights, tower distances from the pad, 
and so forth, will be performed by others. OHSW geometries also should be calculated by others. 
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8.0 Findings, Root Causes, Observations, and Recommendations 
 
8.1 Findings 
 
F-1   The existing Pad 39B lightning protection is inadequate.  Pads 39A and 39B do not have 
contemporary OHSW lightening protection systems designed to recognized codes and 
standards. 
 
F-2. Personnel safety was only briefly discussed.  When it was discussed, there were widely 
differing opinions regarding safety of the present configuration expressed. 
 
F-3. Secondary lightning effects were not discussed. 
 
F-4. Important lightning protection sub-systems such as bonding, grounding, and surge 
protection are not well-characterized at the Pad 39B site. 
 
8.2 Causal Factors 
 
When reviewed using techniques and analysis presently accepted today, the lightning protection 
system presently in place at Pad 39B for more than 25 years was not designed to provide 
adequate protection for the vehicle and personnel.  Analysis with presently-accepted techniques 
shows varying degrees of vulnerability for the existing design. 
 
8.3 Observations 
 
O-1. Caution notices were not in place at the catenary ground points. 
 
 
8.4 Recommendations 
 
These recommendations are directed to the KSC Ground Support Equipment Project Engineer’s 
Office. 
 
R-1. Convey risks and vulnerabilities of present system to SSP and anticipated launch service 
customers. (F-1) 
 
R-2. Continue assessment of the present lightning system and prepare of design improvement 
alternatives for presentation to the SSP and anticipated launch service customers. (F-1) 
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R-3. Study personnel safety, both from the perspective of a short term assessment and a longer 
term study. (F-2, O-1)  
 
R-4. Review secondary effects protection provisions and their effectiveness. (F-3) 
 
R-5. Review bonding, grounding, and surge protection lightning protection provisions and 
their effectiveness. (F-4) 
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9.0 NESC Lessons Learned 
 
The NESC lesson learned from this consultation is that additional definition of the scope of the 
activities would be helpful prior to initiation.  The review of Monte Carlo analysis was 
appropriate and worthwhile.  However, it was not initially anticipated in the contract provisions 
for the experts and increased the overall work required.  For future consultations, perform the 
initial evaluation and allow for contract modifications to consultants. 
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10.0 Definition of Terms (as required)  
 
Catenary A lightning protection wire system at Pad 39B consisting of a 1 inch 
stainless steel wire supported by an 80 foot insulating mast on top of the 
fixed support structure that runs from the mast in a North/south direction 
to grounds 1000 feet away on each side of the mast. 
 
Corrective Actions Changes to design processes, work instructions, workmanship practices, 
training, inspections, tests, procedures, specifications, drawings, tools, 
equipment, facilities, resources, or material that result in preventing, 
minimizing, or limiting the potential for recurrence of a problem.  
 
Electrogeometrical 
Model (EGM) An engineering method for estimating lightning incidence to various 
structures. In this method, one ascribes (explicitly or implicitly) to the 
ground and to objects on the ground the so-called capture surface, such 
that when the descending leader passes through that imaginary surface at a 
specific location, the leader is "captured" by a specific point on the ground 
or on a grounded object. The striking distance is needed for constructing 
the capture surface. 
 
Finding A conclusion based on facts established during the assessment/inspection 
by the investigating authority. 
 
Lightning Leader A lightning process that, in the case of downward cloud-to-ground 
discharges, originates in the thundercloud and extends toward the ground. 
The leader creates a conducting path between the cloud charge source and 
ground and determines the lightning strike point on ground or on grounded 
object. 
 
Lessons Learned Knowledge or understanding gained by experience. The experience may 
be positive, as in a successful test or mission, or negative, as in a mishap 
or failure. A lesson must be significant in that it has real or assumed 
impact on operations; valid in that it is factually and technically correct; 
and applicable in that it identifies a specific design, process, or decision 
that reduces or limits the potential for failures and mishaps, or reinforces a 
positive result.  
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Observation A factor, event, or circumstance identified during the assessment and/or 
inspection that did not contribute to the problem, but if left uncorrected 
has the potential to cause a mishap, injury, or increase the severity should 
a mishap occur.  
 
Problem The subject of the independent technical assessment/inspection. 
 
Recommendation An action identified by the assessment/inspection team to correct a root 
cause or deficiency identified during the investigation.  The 
recommendations may be used by the responsible C/P/P/O in the 
preparation of a corrective action plan. 
 
Rolling Sphere 
Method (RSM) A version of the EGM which is primarily used for placing lightning rods 
on ordinary structures. The geometrical construction of the capture surface 
in the RSM is accomplished simply by rolling an imaginary sphere of 
radius equal to the striking distance across the ground and across objects 
on the ground. Those points the rolling sphere touches can be struck by 
lightning (and hence have to be protected) - the smaller the prospective 
lightning peak current, the smaller the radius of the rolling sphere. 
 
Root Cause Along a chain of events leading to a mishap or close call, the first causal 
action or failure to act that could have been controlled systemically either 
by policy, practice, and/or procedure or individual adherence to policy, 
practice, and/or procedure. 
 
Striking Distance The distance from the tip of the descending leader to the object to be 
struck at the instant when the lightning strike point is thought to be 
uniquely determined. The concept of striking distance, which is assumed 
to be a function of lightning peak current, is the core of the EGM. 
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11.0 List of Acronyms 
 
CCAFS Cape Canaveral Air Force Station 
EGM Electrogeometrical Model 
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility 
ESE Early Streamer Emitter 
ET External Tank 
FSS Fixed Support Structure 
GOx Gaseous Oxygen 
GRC Glenn Research Center 
GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
kA Kiloamperes 
KSC Kennedy Space Center 
kV Kilovolts 
LaRC Langley Research Center 
LPS Lightning Protection System 
MLP Mobile Launch Platform 
NESC NASA Engineering and Safety Center 
NRB NESC Review Board 
OHSW Overhead Shield Wire 
RSM Rolling Sphere Method 
RSS Rotating Support Structure 
SE& I Systems Engineering and Integration 
SERB Shuttle Engineering Review Board 
SLC Space Launch Complex 
SPRT Super Problem Resolution Team 
SSP Space Shuttle Program 
TEM Technical Exchange Meeting 
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13.0 Minority Report (dissenting opinions)  
 
There were no minority opinions voiced during the conduct of the consultation.
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Appendix A.  NESC Request Form (PR-003-FM-01) 
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Appendix B.  Key TEM Input Summaries: E-Mails of Dr. Rakov 
and Mr. Kithil 
 
From: rakov@ece.ufl.edu 
To: "Stover, Billy R" <Billy.R.Stover@nasa.gov>, 
        "Bowen, Barry C \KKSC\"" <Barry.C.Bowen@nasa.gov>, 
        "Crawford, David E" <David.E.Crawford@nasa.gov>, 
        "Delgado, Hector N" <Hector.N.Delgado@nasa.gov>, 
        "Frank A. Fisher" <fafisher@lightningtech.com>, 
        "Garrett, Alma B \BBo\  \UUSA\"" <alma.b.garrett@usa-spaceops.com>, 
        "George C. May" <george.c.may@boeing.com>, 
        "Hampton, John O \UUSA\"" <john.o.hampton@usa-spaceops.com>, 
        "Hancock, Randy A" <Randy.Hancock-1@ksc.nasa.gov>, 
        "Jason Chai" <jason.c.chai@aero.org>, 
        "Lewis, Mark E" <Mark.E.Lewis@nasa.gov>, 
        "Lindholm, Judy A \UUSA\"" <judy.a.lindholm@usa-spaceops.com>, 
        "Lindsay W Coffman" <Lindsay.W.Coffman@aero.org>, 
        "Madura, John T" <John.T.Madura@nasa.gov>, 
        "Magee, Tyrone J \BBoeing\"" <Tyrone.Magee-1@ksc.nasa.gov>, 
        <Mark.Krome@nasa.gov>, <Matt.Mccollum@nasa.gov>, 
        "Medelius, Pedro J" <Pedro.Medelius-1@ksc.nasa.gov>, 
        "Myrsten, Randolph \UUSA\"" <randolph.myrsten@usa-spaceops.com>, 
        <noel.b.sargent@nasa.gov>, 
        "Raffoul, George W " <George.W.Raffoul@boeing.com>, 
        "Richard Kithil" <rich@lightningsafety.com>, 
        "Robert A. Kichak" <robert.a.kichak@nasa.gov>, 
        "SCULLY, ROBERT C. \JJSC-EV\  \NNASA\"" <robert.c.scully@nasa.gov>, 
        "Snyder, Gary P" <Gary.P.Snyder@nasa.gov>, 
        "Speigner, Jimmy O \AAerospace\"" <SpeigJO@kscems.ksc.nasa.gov>, 
        "Stanton, Mark A \UUSA\"" <Mark.A.Stanton@usa-spaceops.com>, 
        "Troutman, Dana R \UUSA\"" <Dana.R.Troutman@usa-spaceops.com>, 
        "Vlad Rakov" <rakov@ece.ufl.edu>, 
        "Wheeler, Jeff D" <Jeffrey.D.Wheeler@nasa.gov>, 
        "Willingham, James T" <Terry.Willingham-1@nasa.gov>, 
        "Winters Katherine A GS-13 45 WS/DOR \PPAFB\"" <Katherine.Winters@patrick.af.mil>, 
        "Mata, Carlos T" <Carlos.Mata-1@ksc.nasa.gov> 
Date: Tue, 30 Aug 2005 17:50:15 -0400 
Subject: RE: Lightning Monte Carlo Results 
CC: "Abner, Charlie A" <Charles.A.Abner@nasa.gov>, 
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        "Cipolletti, John P \UUSA\"" <John.P.Cipolletti@usa-spaceops.com>, 
        "Sullivan, Steven J" <Steven.J.Sullivan@nasa.gov>, 
        "Mata, Carlos T" <Carlos.Mata-1@ksc.nasa.gov> 
Priority: normal 
X-mailer: Pegasus Mail for Windows (v4.02) 
X-Qmail-Scanner: uvscan: v4.3.20/vAug 30 12:29.  
 
Carlos, 
 
The updated Monte Carlo simulation results look good.  About 15% (2 to 3 strikes per  
year, which is consistent with observations) of all the downward-lightning strikes  
within the 1 square kilometer are intercepted by the launch pad.  Depending on  
configuration, 0 to 0.3% of all strikes are expected to terminate on the ET.    
Configuration 1 (RSS rotated back, GOx vent arm rotated back) is the worst case. 
 
The expected number of strikes per year to the ET is 0.052, 0, 0, and 0.020 for  
Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
 
In other words, the ET is expected to be struck on average once in 19 years and  
once in 50 years for Cases 1 and 4, respectively.  For Cases 2 and 3, the ET is not  
expected to be struck at all.  
 
Now, the question of peak currents or charges that represent a threat to ET remains  
open.  If some (smaller) strikes can be tolerated, then the number of potentially  
hazardous direct strikes will be less than that found from the Monte Carlo  
simulations.  
 
On the other hand, the Monte Carlo simulations do not account for any flashovers  
from the structural elements of the launch pad to the ET.  
 
Overall, I think that the updated Monte Carlo simulations do provide the necessary  
information to quantify the threat due to the most deleterious direct lightning strikes. 
 
 
Regards, 
 
Vlad 
--------------------------------- 
 
Dr. Mata described the five analysis cases as follows: 
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We ran a total of 5 cases (four of them were run three times with some variants): 
Case 1: Orbiter in launch configuration, RSS rotated back, LOX vent arm rotated back (three 
runs with max angles of 30, 40, and 60 degrees). 
Case 2: Orbiter in launch configuration, RSS rotated back, LOX vent arm 2 meters from the ET  
(three runs with max angles of 30, 40, and 60 degrees). 
Case 3: Orbiter parked, RSS covering the Orbiter, LOX vent arm 2 meters from the ET (three 
runs with max angles of 30, 40, and 60 degrees). 
Case 4: Orbiter parked, RSS covering the Orbiter, LOX vent arm rotated back (three runs with  
max angles of 30, 40, and 60 degrees). 
Case 5: Same as case 1 but with two auxiliary catenary wires protecting the stack. 
 
From: R Kithil [mailto:rkithil@ix.netcom.com]  
Sent: Wednesday, October 05, 2005 11:50 AM 
To: 'Robert Kichak' 
Cc: Timmy.R.Wilson@nasa.gov; rakov@ece.ufl.edu; rkithil@ix.netcom.com 
Subject: Re: Input From Oct 5 Lightning TIM 
 
Bob and Tim: 
 
My summary of the meeting is: 
    1. Consideration of catenary issues has omitted positive lightning strike manifestations.  
    2. Only vertical lightning strikes are including in the EGM Model, upon which the computer 
simulations were based. What percentage of KSC lightning is less-than-vertical? Can NASA's 
LDAR archives look at this to get an approximation? 
    3. One strike to Space Shuttle every 15 years as a conclusion begs the question of "acceptable 
risk" (raised by Vlad Rakov).  
    4. It remains a Given that the present catenary design was conceived for the Apollo Project. Is 
NASA comfortable using old science for a new structure? What are the measures to be taken to 
enhance LP at Pads 39B after digestion of the study group's data? 
    5. We learned that MSFC (Jeff Anderson) is working up a lightning protection schema for the 
Next-Generation Space Craft. Will the present NESC study group be allowed input into those LP 
design considerations? 
 
Thanks for letting NLSI participate in the Pad 39B catenary study. 
 
Richard Kithil, Jr., Founder & CEO 
National Lightning Safety Institute 
891 N. Hoover Ave., Louisville CO 80027 
Email: rkithil@lightningsafety.com 
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Internet: www.lightningsafety.com 
Tel. 303-666-8817; Fax 303-666-8786 
A Non-Profit Agency Providing Objective 
Information about Lightning Hazards. 
 
 
------- Forwarded message follows -------  
From:            rakov@ece.ufl.edu  
To:              "Vlad Rakov" <rakov@ece.ufl.edu>,  
              "Rich Kithil" <RKithil@lightningsafety.com>,  
              "Noel Sargent" <noel.b.sargent@nasa.gov>,  
              Robert Kichak <Robert.A.Kichak@nasa.gov>  
Date sent:       Wed, 05 Oct 2005 14:25:25 -0400  
Subject:         Re: Tomorrow's Lightning TIM  
Copies to:       Timmy.R.Wilson@nasa.gov  
Priority:        normal  
  
Bob,  
  
The KSC telecon meeting on Oct. 5 went well. I also had a separate phone   
conversation with Jason Chai, who missed the meeting but submitted written   
comments prior to it. Here are some observations.  
  
1. The issue of vertical vs. non-vertical leaders has been discussed. I have   
commented on this issue several times before. The bottom line is that, in the   
updated Monte Carlo simulations, (1) descending leaders are initially vertical,   
because they do not "sense" the presence of any objects on ground and (2) vertical   
leaders become non-vertical when they come within tens to hundreds of meters of   
the prospective strike point, because they are attracted by grounded objects. I do not   
believe initially-non-vertical leaders should be considered because (1) there is no   
good way to specify lightning channel tortuosity (whatever you do it will be arbitrary;   
the way it was done by KSC is not correct) and (2) the difference it makes (30% or so   
in power-line studies) is less than the uncertainties involved in the elctrogeometrical   
model.  
  
2. Calculations were done for negative lightning only. They will additionally do   
positive lightning by the end of the month. I have sent them a paper that contains info   
needed for modeling positive lightning.  
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3. All the results up to date are concerned with direct strike effects. This was clearly   
stated by Pedro, but needs to be in writing in all documents related to this project. I   
hope that possible flashovers, induced effects, surges arriving along the wires, and   
safety issues will be addressed at later stages of the project.  
  
4. Mark Lewis stated that the next step will be risk assessment (to answer the   
question on what lightning incidence is acceptable; unfortunately, lightning   
elimination is not an option), which will have to involve forces outside the Lightning   
TIM.  
  
Regards,  
  
Vlad  
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Appendix C.  Monte Carlo Simulation Report 
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Appendix D.  Shuttle Engineering Review Board November 8, 2005 
Presentation by Dr. Medelius  
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Appendix E.  Lightning Protection for NASA KSC Facilities:  A 
Comprehensive Matrix Approach by R. Kithil 
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Appendix F.  Estimation of the Effectiveness of the Space Shuttle 
Launch Pad Lightning Protection System – Dr. Vladimir Rakov 
Estimation of the Effectiveness of the Space Shuttle Launch Pad Lightning 
Protection System 
 
Contribution to NESC Report on the Lightning TIM (KSC, June 21-22, 2005) 
 
by V.A. Rakov 
 
1. Introduction 
 
I attended the Lightning TIM held at the Kennedy Space Center on June 21-22, 2005. 
The meeting included a tour of Pad B, a three-part presentation on the lightning protective 
system (LPS) of Pad B by Dr. Pedro Medelius (former University of Florida Ph.D. student), a 
talk on lightning detection and warning at KSC by John Madura, and a presentation on 3D 
simulation of lightning incidence to various structures by Frank Fisher. There was also time 
provided for discussion of presented materials. Additionally, I communicated in private with 
several TIM participants, in particular with Drs. Pedro Medelius and Carlos Mata (my former 
Ph.D. student), Mr. Rich Kithil, and Dr. Frank Fisher.  
 
The structure of my report is as follows. I’ll start, in Section 2, with general information 
on lightning incidence to various objects and then, in Section 3, give a review of the 
Electrogeometrical Model (EGM), a version of which called the Rolling Sphere Method (RSM) 
was employed by Dr. Pedro Medelius in his lightning incidence analysis. I’ll show both 
advantages and limitations of this method. Then, in Section 4, I’ll comment on the three-part 
presentation of Dr. Pedro Medelius and make suggestions on correcting and improving his 
analysis. Finally, in Section 5, I’ll summarize my observations, findings, and recommendations 
for future work. 
 
2. Lightning Incidence to Various Objects 
 
I first briefly describe how cloud-to-ground lightning "decides" on its ground termination 
point.  Ground flashes are normally initiated by stepped leaders that originate in the 
thundercloud.  As the downward-extending leader channel, usually negatively charged, 
approaches the ground, the enhanced electric field intensity at irregularities of the Earth's surface 
or at protruding grounded objects increases and eventually exceeds the breakdown value of air.  
As a result, one or more upward-moving leaders are initiated from those points.  When one of the 
upward-moving leaders from the ground contacts a branch of the downward-moving stepped 
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leader, the point of lightning termination on ground is determined.  Grounded vertical objects 
produce relatively large electric field enhancement near their upper extremities so that upward-
moving connecting leaders from these objects start earlier than from the surrounding ground and, 
therefore, serve to make the object a preferential lightning termination point.  In general, the 
higher the object, the greater the field enhancement and hence the higher the probability that a 
stepped leader will terminate on the object.  In the limit, when the height (field enhancement 
capability, to be more exact) of the object becomes so large that the upward-moving leader from 
the object tip can be initiated by in-cloud charges or, more likely, by in-cloud discharge 
processes, as opposed to being initiated by the charge on the descending stepped leader, the 
object becomes capable of initiating upward lightning.  The latter, as opposed to a "normal," 
downward lightning, would not occur if the object were not there.  Ground-based objects with 
heights ranging from about 100 to 500 m experience both downward and upward flashes, with 
the proportion being a function of object height.  Eriksson (1987a) derived the following 
equation for the annual lightning incidence N (in yr
-1
) to ground-based objects, including both 
downward and upward (if any) flashes: 
 
N = 24 × 10
-6
 Hs 
2.05
 Ng  (1) 
 
where Hs is the object height in meters and Ng is the ground flash density in km
-2
 yr
-1
.  To do so, 
he employed (1) the observations of lightning incidence to structures of heights ranging from 20 
to 540 m in different countries, (2) the corresponding local values of the annual number of 
thunderstorm days TD, and (3) an empirical equation relating Ng and TD. For Pad B, Hs = 106 m, 
Ng  = 10 km
-2
 yr
-1
, and N from Eq. 1 is about 3.4 yr
-1
.  
 
Eriksson (1978a) tabulated the observed percentage of upward flashes as a function of a 
free-standing structure's height, reproduced in Table 1.  Eriksson and Meal (1984) fitted the data 
in Table 1 with the following expression: 
 
Pu = 52.8 ln Hs – 230  (2) 
 
where Pu is the percentage of upward flashes and Hs is the structure height in meters.  This 
equation is valid only for structure heights ranging from 78 to 518 m, since for Hs = 78 m Pu = 0 
and for Hs = 518 m Pu = 100%.  Structures with heights less than 78 m are not covered by Eq. 1 
because they are expected to be struck by downward flashes only, and structures with a height of 
greater than 518 m are not covered because they are expected to experience upward flashes only.  
For Pad B, Hs = 106 m, and the percentage of upward flashes from Eq. 2 is 16%. 
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Table 1.  The percentage of upward flashes from tall structures. Adapted  
from Eriksson (1978a). 
Reference Structure height, m Percentage of 
upward flashes 
Pierce (1972) 150 
200 
300 
400 
23 
50 
80 
91 
McCann (1944) 110 
180 
400 
  8 
24 
96 
Berger (1972)  350
a
 84 
Gorin (1972);  
Gorin et al. (1976) 
540   92
b
 
Garbagnati et al. (1974)    500
c
 98 
 
a
An effective height of 350 m has been assigned by Eriksson to Berger's 70-m high mountain-top towers 
to account for the enhancement of the electric field by the mountain whose top is 640 m above Lake 
Lugano (914 m above sea level).  Pierce (1971) assigned a different effective height of 270-m to the 
Berger's towers. 
 
b
50% of the flashes recorded in this study were classified as 'unidentified'.  The relative incidence of 
upward flashes is based upon analysis of only the identified data. 
 
c
Garbagnati et al.'s towers were 40 m high, located on mountain tops, 980 and 993 m above sea level 
(Berger and Garbagnati 1984).  Eriksson (1978a) does not give any explanations of the assumed effective 
height of 500 m. 
 
In practice, as stated above, structures having heights less than 100 m or so are often 
assumed to be struck by downward lightning only, and the upper height limit can be simply 
taken as 500 m.  Accordingly, the total lightning incidence N to a structure is the sum of the 
downward-flash incidence Nd and upward-flash incidence Nu if the structure height is in the 
range from about 100 to 500 m, N = Nd for structures shorter than 100 m, and N = Nu for 
structures taller than 500 m.  If both downward and upward flashes are expected, they are often 
treated separately in estimating the lightning incidence to an object, as described below.  
 
Downward flashes.  When the incidence of downward lightning is estimated, it is common to 
ascribe a so-called equivalent attractive (or exposure) area to the grounded object.  The attractive 
area can be viewed as an area on flat ground surface that would receive the same number of 
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lightning strikes in the absence of the object as does the object placed in the center of that area.  
In other words, in computing lightning incidence to a structure, the structure is replaced by an 
equivalent area on ground.  For a free-standing structure whose plan-view dimensions are much 
smaller than its height (such as a mast, tower, or chimney), this area, A, is circular and is 
generally given by A = Ra
2
, where Ra is the equivalent attractive radius, discussed later.  For 
straight, horizontally extended structures (such as power lines or their sections), the equivalent 
attractive area is rectangular and is sometimes termed the "shadow zone" or "attractive swath."  
For example, if a power line has a length l, and an effective width b (usually taken as the 
horizontal distance between overhead shield wires or between the outer phase conductors), its 
equivalent attractive area is generally estimated as A = l(b + 2Ra), where Ra is the equivalent 
attractive distance generally thought to be approximately equal to the equivalent attractive radius 
for a free-standing structure of the same height (Eriksson 1987a; Rakov and Lutz 1990).  Further, 
the local ground flash density Ng is assumed to be spatially uniform in the absence of the 
structure, so that the downward lightning incidence to the structure is found as  
 
Nd = A Ng (3) 
 
Usually Ng is in km
_2
 yr
_1
 so that A should be expressed in km
2
 to obtain Nd in yr
_1
 (strikes per 
year). 
  
The equivalent attractive radius (or distance) Ra is usually assumed to be a function of 
structure height Hs and is generally expressed as  
 
Ra = α Hs

 (4) 
 
where α and  are empirical constants.  The procedures used to obtain Eq. 4 from data on 
lightning incidence to structures of different height is given, for example, by Eriksson (1978a, 
1987a).  In Eq. 4, both Hs and Ra are in meters, and different values of α and  have been 
proposed.  For example, Whitehead et al. (1993) gave α = 2 and  = 1.09 for transmission lines, 
while CIGRE Document 63 (1991) recommended α = 14 and  = 0.6.  The attractive radius for 
individual strikes should depend on the charge carried by the descending leader, this charge 
being correlated with the associated return-stroke peak current.  In this regard, Eq. 4 should be 
understood as representing the entire distribution of peak currents.  In the so-called 
electrogeometrical approach (Section 3), which is widely used for the estimation of lightning 
incidence in lightning protection studies (e.g., CIGRE Document 63, 1991), the equivalent 
attractive radius explicitly depends on the statistical distribution of lightning peak currents (e.g., 
Eriksson 1987a; Rakov and Lutz 1988, 1990).   
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Estimation of Nd from Eq. 3 implies a reasonably long-term value of ground flash density 
and yields a long-term average value of lightning incidence.  For example, if a 60-m tower is 
located in a part of Florida where Ng = 10 km
_2
 yr
_1
, the long-term average downward lightning 
incidence will be about 0.5 yr
-1
 (assuming α = 2 and  = 1), that is, the tower will be struck on 
average every other year.  The use of Eq. 1 would result in a lightning incidence value of about 1 
yr
-1
.   
 
Upward flashes.   Once the incidence of downward lightning Nd is found from Eq. 3 using the 
concept of an equivalent attractive area, the incidence of upward flashes Nu can be determined by 
subtracting Nd from N given by Eq. 1.  Recall that if the structure height is less than 100 m or so, 
it is usually assumed that Nu = 0.  If only the percentage of upward flashes is sought, Eq. 2 can 
be used. 
 
 Upward flashes tend to develop from the highest point of the object, which is normally an 
air terminal of its LPS. For this reason, upward flashes are usually of no concern in estimating 
the “shielding failure” mode of lightning interaction with the object. 
 
3. Electrogeometrical Model (EGM) 
 
The attachment of the leader to the strike object is often described using the so-called 
electrogeometrical model (EGM), the core of which is the concept of a “striking distance”. This 
concept obscures some of the significant physics but allows the development of relatively simple 
and useful techniques for designing lightning protection systems for various structures. The 
striking distance can be defined as the distance from the tip of the descending leader to the object 
to be struck at the instant when an upward connecting leader is initiated from this object. It is 
assumed that at this time the lightning termination point is uniquely determined. For a given 
striking distance, one can define an imaginary surface above the ground and above objects on the 
ground (see Fig. 1) such that, when the descending leader passes through that surface at a 
specific location, the leader is “captured” by a specific point on the ground or on a grounded 
object. The geometrical construction of this surface can be accomplished simply by rolling an 
imaginary sphere of radius equal to the assumed striking distance across the ground and across 
objects on the ground, the so-called rolling sphere method (RSM) (e.g., Lee, 1978; NFPA 780). 
The locus of all points traversed by the center of the rolling sphere forms the imaginary capture 
surface referred to above. Those points that the rolling sphere touches can be struck, according to 
this approach; and points where the sphere does not touch cannot. Fig. 2 illustrates the rolling 
sphere method. The shaded area in Fig. 2 is that area into which, it is postulated, lightning cannot 
enter. 
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Fig. 1. Illustration of capture surfaces of two towers and earth’s surface in the electrogeometrical 
model. rs is the striking distance. Vertical arrows represent descending leaders, assumed to be 
uniformly distributed above the capture surfaces. Adapted from Bazelyan and Raizer (2000). 
 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the rolling sphere method for two objects shown in black. D is the striking 
distance (same as rs in Fig. 1.). Shaded area is that area into which, it is postulated, lightning 
cannot enter. Adapted from Szczerbinski (2000). 
 
In the rolling sphere method, the striking distance is assumed to be the same for any 
object projecting above the earth’s surface and for the earth itself. There are variations of the 
EGM in which the assumption of different striking distances for objects of different geometry is 
used (e.g., Eriksson 1987a,b). The main application of the rolling sphere method is positioning 
air terminals on an ordinary structure, so that one of the terminals, rather than a roof edge or 
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other part of the structure, initiates the upward leader that intercepts the descending leader and, 
hence, becomes the lightning attachment point. 
 
The striking distance is usually expressed as a function of prospective return-stroke peak 
current. The procedure to obtain such an expression typically involves assumptions of leader 
geometry, total leader charge, distribution of charge along the leader channel, and critical 
average electric field between the leader tip and the strike object at the time of the initiation of 
upward connecting leader from this object. This critical electric field is assumed to be equal to 
the average breakdown field from long laboratory spark experiments with rod-rod and rod-plane 
gaps, which varies with waveshape of applied voltage as well as with other factors such as the 
high-voltage generator circuitry. The typical assumed values range from 200 to 600 kV/m. As a 
result, one can obtain an expression relating the striking distance to the total leader charge. In the 
next step, the observed correlation (see Fig. 3) between the charge and resultant return-stroke 
peak current (Berger 1972) is used to express the striking distance, rs, in terms of the peak 
current, I. The most popular striking-distance expression, included in many lightning protection 
standards, is 
 
rs = 10 I
0.65
                 (5) 
 
where I is in kA and rs is in meters. This and other expressions for the striking distance found in 
the literature are illustrated in Fig. 4. Given all the assumptions involved and large scatter seen in 
Fig. 3, each of these relationships is necessarily crude, and the range of variation among the 
individual expressions (see Fig. 4) is up to a factor of 3 or more. Therefore, there are 
considerable uncertainties in estimating the striking distance. On the other hand, there is 
satisfactory long-term (the RSM has been in the Hungarian Standard on Lightning Protection 
since 1962; Horvath, 2000) experience with the RSM as applied to placement of lightning rods 
on ordinary structures and with the EGM in general as applied to power lines. This experience is 
the primary justification for the continuing use of this method in lightning protection studies. In 
fact, as of today, the EGM is the best engineering tool for estimating lightning incidence to 
structures, which is indorsed by the IEEE and IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission). 
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Fig. 3. Scatter plot of impulse charge, Q, versus return-stroke peak current, I. Note that both 
vertical and horizontal scales are logarithmic. The best fit to data, I = 10.6 Q
0.7
, where Q is in 
coulombs and I is in kiloamperes, was used in deriving Eq. 5. Adapted from Berger (1972). 
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Fig. 4. Striking distance versus return-stroke peak current [curve 1, Golde (1945); curve 2, 
Wagner (1963); curve 3, Love (1973); curve 4, Ruhling (1972); x, theory of Davis (1962); o, 
estimates from two-dimensional photographs by Eriksson (1978); ⁪, estimates from three-
dimensional photography by Eriksson (1978). Adapted from Golde (1977) and Eriksson (1978). 
 
The EGM can be used for estimating lightning incidence to different elements (usually to 
the protected object) of a structure as follows. One needs to (1) assume the spatial distribution of 
descending lightning leaders above all the capture surfaces (see Fig. 1) and specify the ground 
flash density, Ng (typically Ng = const), (2) find the striking distance, rs(I), and then the 
projection, S(I), of the resultant capture surface of the element in question onto the ground 
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surface, (3) specify the statistical distribution (the probability density function, to be more exact) 
of lightning peak currents, f(I), and (4) integrate the product Ng x S(I) x f(I) x dI from 0 to Imax, to 
obtain the lightning incidence (number of strikes per year). Alternatively, one can eliminate 
finding S(I) in item (2) and entire item (4) from the outlined procedure using the Monte Carlo 
technique. It is important to note that the use of the RSM alone does not generally allow one to 
estimate lightning incidence to an element of structure (for example, to the orbiter on the launch 
pad), because such an estimate requires information on the spatial distribution of lightning 
leaders, which is not part of the standard RSM. 
 
4. Comments on Dr. Medelius’ RSM Analysis 
 
Overall, the presented analysis needs to be re-done to (1) replace the statistical 
distribution of peak currents with a more appropriate one (the one found in IEC or IEEE 
lightning protection standards), (2) account for the spatial distribution of lightning leaders in 
estimating the lightning incidence to the orbiter (“shielding failure” rate), and (3) consider 
positive lightning flashes that constitute about 10% of the overall lightning activity, but can be 
dominant in the dissipating stage of a thunderstorm, in cold season, and under some other 
meteorological conditions (Rakov 2003). Note that it is more difficult to protect against positive 
lightning, because it is associated with a smaller striking distance. Additionally, the probability 
of flashover from the launching structure (in particular, from the GOx Vent Arm) to the orbiter 
(ET) should be estimated. More specific comments are given below. 
 
History and Background 
 
Slide 3, Ground Flash Density Map. This map is based on the NLDN data for 1996-2000. 
According to this map, the ground flash density for the KSC area is about 10 km
-2
yr
-1
. The 
correction factor to account for multiple channel terminations on ground in Florida is 1.7 (Rakov 
and Uman 2003), resulting in Ng =17 km
-2
yr
-1
. 
 
Slide 4, Cumulative Distribution of Peak Currents. The specified values of the median 
(27.7 kA) and standard deviation (0.461) are incorrect. The correct values found in CIGRE 
Document 63 (1991) are 31 kA and 0.484, respectively. I have provided the correct CIGRE 
distribution, as well as the IEEE distribution (having the same median value, 31 kA), to Dr. 
Carlos Mata. These distributions are reproduced in Fig. 5 below. 
 
Slides 9-14. Cone of Protection Method. Catenary wires also provide lightning 
protection, while their protective effect is not shown in these slides. 
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Fig. 5. Cumulative statistical distributions of peak currents (percent values on the vertical axis 
should be subtracted from 100% to obtain the probability to exceed the peak current value on the 
horizontal axis) for negative first strokes adopted by IEEE and CIGRE and used in various 
lightning protection standards. Adapted from CIGRE Document 63 (1991). 
 
Findings and Analysis 
 
Slide 7. Using Eriksson’s Equation. The equivalent height equal to H/2 is arbitrary. I 
think 2H/3 would be more appropriate (and more consistent with power line studies). 
 
Slides 9 and 10. How often is the Space Shuttle Vehicle expected to be struck by 
lightning? These are very important slides, since they address the primary question of the 
meeting. In my view, combining the arbitrarily assumed “environmental coefficient C1” and  
results of RSM analysis is not a self-consistent approach. The use of the Monte Carlo technique, 
to account for the spatial distribution of lightning leaders, in conjunction with the RSM (EGM), 
as decided at the meeting, should fix this problem. 
 
Slide 15. Rolling Sphere Method. It should be made clear that this slide is to illustrate the 
estimation of Imax (see the last paragraph of Section 3 above).     
 
Slide 17. “Step Length” should be replaced with “Striking Distance”. 
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Slides 27-35. I have a problem understanding these illustrations of the RSM, as I stated 
during the meeting and discussed in private with Dr. Carlos Mata. The yellow sphere appears to 
be stationary, centered on the Shuttle, and to expand as the peak current increases. Perhaps these 
illustrations do convey the intended information, but they appear to be inconsistent with the 
RSM concept, in which the center of the sphere represents the tip of descending leader. This 
comment also applies to Slides 37-43, 45-52, and 54-58. The correct representation of the 
protected area based on the RSM is found in Slide 26, although the protective effect of the 
catenary wires in that slide seems to be neglected. 
 
Slide 60. Summary of Analysis using Rolling Sphere Method (and elsewhere). The 
percentages for 150 kA and 60 kA are incorrect. The correct values are 1.6% and 15% (IEEE 
distribution), respectively. Further, the “% of strikes with adequate protection” does not account 
for the spatial distribution of lightning leaders. For example, 76% for 20 kA implies that 24% 
(100% - 76%) of all strokes will terminate on the orbiter, which is not correct, since some of the 
strokes with peak currents less than 20 kA will terminate on the LPS, leading to an increase in 
the “% of strikes with adequate protection”. The use of the Monte Carlo technique, to account for 
the spatial distribution of lightning leaders, in conjunction with the RSM (EGM), as decided at 
the meeting, should fix this problem. 
 
Design Alternative: Parallel Catenary Wires 
 
Slides 3-6 and 8-10. I think that two additional wires running in the west direction would 
make the LPS more balanced, both mechanically and electrically. 
 
 
 
4. Summary 
 
Overall, I think the meeting was well organized and did facilitate productive interaction 
(exchange of ideas) among the participants. From the technical point of view, in my opinion, the 
existing lightning protective system (apparently designed in 1970s) of the Space Shuttle Launch 
Pad is inferior to that of essentially any other major launch facility in the world. The modern 
approach to lightning protection of launch sites typically includes multiple (usually 3 or 4) 
towers supporting multiple horizontal conductors, with the overall structure approaching an 
imperfect Faraday cage. As an example, Fig. 6 shows the LPS of the Indian Satellite Launch Pad, 
in which the launch vehicle is surrounded by three 120-m towers separated by 180 m and 
interconnected by horizontal wires. For such an LPS in the region characterized by 50-90 
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thunderstorm days per year a “shielding failure” (direct lightning attachment to the launch 
vehicle) is expected to occur once in about 500-1000 years. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  An example of modern lightning protective system of a launch pad. LV =  
Launch Vehicle; UT = Umbilical Tower. Adapted from Kumar and Joseph (2003). 
 
Given the high level of lightning activity in Florida and the number of operations 
(exposure), the likelihood of "shielding failure" for Pad B appears to be excessively high. On the 
other hand, I concur with Terry Willingham that it is necessary to obtain an estimate of 
consequences (as a function of peak current or charge transfer) of a direct lightning strike to the 
orbiter (loaded ET), in order to determine a meaningful acceptable "shielding failure" rate. 
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Appendix G.  KSC Launch Pad 39 A/B Catenary Capability for 
Lightning Protection – Richard Kithil 
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Appendix H.  Assessment of June 21 & 22, 2005 Lightning TIM – 
Noel Sargent 
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Appendix I.  NASA Facts – Lightning and the Space Program 
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